McClellan believed Johnston's army to be twice as large as it really was.[1]

2. In many,—in fact, in most,—of the criticisms of General McClellan for his inactivity during the autumn of 1861, much stress is laid on the great size of his army. There are, however, two important matters to be considered in this connection.

In the first place, the total force reported as being, on a particular day, at the disposal of the commanding general is too often assumed to consist entirely of troops able to take the field. The necessary deductions from this total are not made. Thus, to take an instance, the total number of troops, present and absent, on the 15th of October, 1861, in and about Washington, including those in and about Baltimore, and on the "upper and lower Potomac, is—

Officially reported[2] as	152,051
Deduct now, the absent	8,404
the sick	9,290
those in confinement	1,156
	18,850
And we have left only	133,201
Deduct now those who were without arms and equipments[3]	12,000
And we have left as "present for duty"	121,201
Deduct now one sixth of these as men on "extra duty"[4]	20,200
And we have left only	101,001

[1] "He (McClellan) simply added together the aggregates furnished by the guesses of his spies, and implicitly believed the monstrous sum." 5 N. & H., 152. *Cf.* N. Y., 176, 177.

[2] 5 W. R., 12.

[3] McClellan's O. S., 77.

[4] McClellan cites the high authority of the late General

Humphreys,,
chief-of-staff to General Meade, for this estimate,—one
sixth,—of the